Abstract-Tamper-resistant devices provide a secure, reliable, and trusted execution environment even in the possession of an adversary. With ever growing use of computing platforms (i.e. mobile phones, tablets and embedded devices, etc.) the potential for compromising the security and privacy of an individual is increased. The Trusted Platform Module is restricted to integrity measurement and cryptographic operations, which is crucial in its own right. On the contrary, smart cards provide a generalpurpose execution environment, but traditionally they are under a centralised control, which if extended to the other computing platforms may not be appropriate. Therefore, in this paper we analyse the rationale for a general-purpose cross-platform user centric tamper-resistant device based on the smart card architecture, its applications in different computing environments, along with the ownership management framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile phones and tablets (e.g. iPad) account for a major section of computing platforms that are utilised by public. To some extend security and privacy issues of personal computers are carried to the hand-held devices including the insecure execution environment. As reliance on these platforms increases, they will venture into the application realm that deals with the security and privacy of the platform and its user. For example, a healthcare mobile application may reveal the medical history of its user.
A possible avenue is to have a tamper-resistant execution environment that executes a program in a trusted, secure, reliable, and fault-tolerant environment. Among widely deployed tamper-resistant devices, two are most prominent: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [1] , and smart cards [2] . The TPM provides platform's integrity measurement with cryptographic protection. While smart cards are a generic execution environment on which an application can execute and store, application code and data. Therefore, in this paper the proposed generic cross-platform tamper-resistant device is based on the smart card architecture.
Since their inception, smart cards are mostly deployed as security tokens. Therefore, security and reliability have been the core of the design paradigm in the smart card industry [3] . Smart cards are now widely adopted in a range of security and privacy sensitive industries (i.e. banking, telecom, healthcare, and transport, etc.). The smart card architecture has been rigorously analysed and studied both by the smart card industry and academics, and its one of the best known examples of a secure, reliable, trusted, and fault-tolerant tamper-resistant device. Although, smart cards support multiple applications, which can co-exist and execute in a secure and reliable manner but the overall architecture is stringently controlled by a centralised authority termed as a card issuer [4] . This stringent control is unsuitable if we scale the architecture as a generic device that can be incorporated with mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers, etc. In this paper, we provide a secure, reliable, trusted, dynamic, and ubiquitous architecture for a generic cross-platform tamper-resistant device that is under a user's control, referred as User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD). The UCTD can be in any form-factor (i.e. shape and size), available as a smart card, and add-ons to mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers, etc.
We begin with the motivation for a generic cross-platform user centric tamper-resistant device in section II. In Section III, we detail the architecture of the UCTD and discuss its components. Section IV explains the concept of ownership in the context of a UCTD and its management architecture. Two case studies for the UCTD's application are described in section V. Finally, section VI provides a conclusion of the paper with future research directions.
II. MOTIVATION
The motivation to have a generic tamper-resistant device that is under the control of its user rather than a centralised authority comes from three distinct but inter-related computing fields, discussed individually in subsequent sections.
A. Smart Card Environment
Traditionally, smart cards are a single-service device (i.e. a banking card will only provide banking services), and they are under the sole control of the Card Issuing Bank (CIB). Such a business model is referred as Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) [4] . Multi-application smart cards are around since late 1990s that can have multiple applications from different organisations in a secure and reliable manner [5] . However, issues related to the card control, marketing potential, customer loyalty, and potential revenue source, decelerated its adoption [4] .
Nevertheless, as pointed by M. E. Porter [6] , the crucial elements that push the competition and innovation in an industry can be: (a) threat of new entrants, (b) threat of substitute products/devices, and (c) consumer power (culture). Therefore, for the smart card industry these elements are present in the shape of Apps on smart phones that can offer services traditionally restricted to smart cards (i.e. banking and ticketing, etc.) [7] , and technology savvy consumer requires more features on a device [8] .
Furthermore, G. Carnabuci [9] noted that technological innovation is inherently an ecological process. Meaning that technological development in one technology domain affects other domains that either have a symbiotic dependency or in competition with each other. The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology [10] enables a mobile phone to emulate a contactless smart card, this innovation has reinvigorated the interest in the multi-application smart cards [11] . Therefore, NFC technology on one hand provides an opportunity for convergence of different services on a single smart card; on the other hand, provision of having mobile phones Apps are poised to generate competition to smart card industry from new entrants and substitute products/services.
In NFC trials around the world [12], the prominent framework that is deployed is an extension of the ICOM model and referred as Trusted Service Manager (TSM) [13] (figure 1). It has gained the support from major industrial players like banking and telecom sector [14, 15] . However, there is no resolution in sight on who will be the TSM (or scheme manager) for the NFC based smart card services, which is contested between the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), and CIBs, but it will not be a surprise if Transport Service Operators (TSOs), Smart Card Manufacturers (SCMs) and Mobile Phone Manufacturers (MPMs) will join in. Therefore, we consider that there exists a possibility that the TSM initiative will end up creating market segmentation. The underlying assumption for the scalability of the TSM initiative relies that all TSMs will establish a trust relationship with each other, and an application provider enrolled with one TSM can offer its application to a customer of any associated TSMs. However, experience in the smart card industry suggests that there are examples of collaborations among competitors [16] but lack of the multi-application smart card deployments beg to differ. A simplistic TSM architecture is illustrated in figure 1 . In such an environment, a customer of an MNO that has a relationship with TSM-1 would only be able to have applications from CIBs, TSOs and leisure centres that are associated with the TSM-1. However, if the respective customer does banking with a CIB that is associated with the TSM-2 then either she has to acquire a new smart card from the TSM-2 or change bank; hence, effectively creating market segmentation.
The limited scalability roots from the fact: (a) not all application providers can establish or manage a relationship with every possible TSM, and (b) not all TSMs would be part of a single syndicated TSM. In addition, to be part of a collaborative scheme a TSM might require a subscription fee from application providers. Hence, small or medium scale organisations like local libraries, universities, and health centres may not be able to afford it. We consider that such a barrier to enter the scheme reduces its flexibility. Furthermore, it lacks true ubiquity as different countries might opt for having their own independent TSMs. Therefore, tourists or business travellers would face difficulty in acquiring applications (i.e. application from a TSO) in a foreign country. These issues are just on top of the ones that are discussed in [4, 5, 17] including ownership privileges, customer loyalty, customer relationship management, and revenue generation. Therefore, we consider a different business and technology model that not only provides "freedom of choice 1 " to the smart card users but if required it helps to achieve revenue generation for TSM (or card issuer); hence, providing a dynamic, ubiquitous and (universally) scalable architecture. The user control can be based either on the User Centric Smart Card Model (UCOM) [4] or on the Coopetitive Architecture [16] in which cardholder retains the application choice but under the provision of a TSM. In both scenarios, the baseline architecture is in congruent with the UCTD (section III-A).
B. Hand-held Devices
We use the term hand-held devices to refer to mobile phones and tablets. The reason for grouping them together is based on the similarity of the application lifecycle on these devices.
The so called "App Culture" promoted by the Apple Inc. that enables a user to seamlessly download an application they desire has opened up the mobile phone application market to a wide range of companies [8] . New ideas are being tested; for example, Starbucks' customers can pay for the coffee using "Starbucks Card Mobile App" on their iPhones. This indicates that there can be additional services/organisations which develop mobile applications that perform sensitive processing like banking or healthcare, which traditionally require a strong security and privacy architecture. Predominantly, the mobile phone platforms are not extensively evaluated for their security and privacy services as it is normal in high-end smart cards. In addition, as most of the smart-phones do not have a tamper-resistant execution environment [19] (except for the secure element 2 that is under a stringent centralised authority: card issuer or TSM). In addition, lack of MTM adoption leave App developers with no choice but to develop the applications that will run on a non-evaluated and possible insecure/compromised platform.
If we analyse the mobile phone environment, the App download concept resembles with the ICOM model. For example, on an iPhone an application cannot be installed, unless it's in conformance to the Apple's stated regulations 3 (that are enforced by mandatory review by the Apple's App Store). It is possible to write malicious applications that can bypass the Apple's App Store review [20] .
Nevertheless, we need to look at the hand-held devices as part of potential military, corporate espionage, and civilian attack surface. The UCTD will enable an App developer to store and execute the security and privacy related code and data on a tamper-resistant secure device. The application of UCTD can include but not limited to the mobile and online banking, e-commerce, mobile ticketing, healthcare, and content-filters, etc.
Similarly, the tablet platform is gaining market share and having a similar product lifecycle like a mobile phone. Therefore, the possibilities and issues we discussed above regarding the mobile phone platform are also true for the tablet platform.
C. Traditional Computing Devices
These computing platforms are used in personal and corporate spheres, and they provide access to a wide range of services. Most of these services require security and privacy of the user, along with satisfying the requirements of service providers (i.e. banks, and corporate servers, etc.) to authenticate the user who is accessing their services. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [1] started a commendable initiative for providing a tamper-resistant device referred as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [21] . The mission statement of the TCG is to provide authentication, data protection, network security, and disaster recovery [1] . A TPM would measure the integrity matrix referred as Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that are securely sealed with cryptographic keys. If the TPM finds any discrepancies in the future integrity measurements then it will flag the problem. A TPM does not decide whether this discrepancy is authorised by the user or due to a malicious entity.
It can be argued that TPM provides adequate security and privacy service. We are not contesting this notion, what we are trying to suggest is that by having a tamper-resistant device that can store applications and execute them within its bounds can go further than what TPM has achieved. The problem with this notion it that most of the tamper-resistant devices capable of executing applications are under centralised control (as in smart card industry) [4, 5] , or they are stripped down to cryptographic services [21] - [25] . The UCTD avoids these issues and provides an open and dynamic tamper-resistant device on which application developers can store and execute security and privacy sensitive parts of their application.
The UCTD can help in the de-centralisation of the user related sensitive data from the service providers' database servers. One of the applications can be the Online Social Network (OSN) provider. There are many proposals that balance the requirements of service providers (i.e. Facebook) that provide free services and require some access to user's information (i.e. for targeted marketing purposes) and the user's requirements of privacy [26] - [28] . Most of these proposals use decentralisation or give control of personal data to a user (by encrypting the privacy related data and giving the encryption key to the user).
Similarly, banks can develop applications for the UCTD to provide secure online banking, and e-commerce functionality. The UCTD application can in fact augment the existing architecture of the 3D-Secure [29] (i.e. MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by VISA are deployments of 3D-Secure) that have poor technical-security and security-usability along with privacy issues [30, 31] . For brevity, we do not dive into the details how UCTD based application 4 that is incorporated to provide better security, privacy and usability, can be implemented.
As a final example, we discuss the trusted internet identities (Internet ID) [31] and a recent USA government proposal [34] suggesting to have a cross-platform (i.e. traditional and handheld computers) Internet IDs for users whom they can use to access varied services (in other words, Internet ID will act as Single-Sign-On: SSO). In an SSO, a user register with an entity and it issues her some credentials which she can use access different services (e.g. Microsoft Passport). However, for Internet IDs we suggest that they should be issued as secure and privacy-persevering applications that are stored and executes on a UCTD.
Most of the applications that we have discussed in this section are also applicable to the hand-held devices. So there is an apparent overlap in the applications that these computing platforms can use with the UCTD.
D. Why User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device?
If we further analyse the three computing platform environments discussed in previous section, there are initiatives that advocate of having tamper-resistant processing devices. In hand-held and traditional computer devices, proposals like TPM [1] , MTM [35] , AEGIS [25] , ARM TrustZone [22] and Trusted Execution Module [36] , already exists. Most of these devices are: (a) limited to a particular computing environment (i.e. TPM [21] and MTM [35] ), (b) only provide execution protection (i.e. AEGIS), (c) limited application execution without user control (i.e. Trusted Execution Module), (d) have limited scalability regarding the support for different application and platform scenarios, (e) does not provide dynamic trust validation and assurance [37] and require an implicit trust, (f) does not require third party evaluation like Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation [38] and (g) does not provide user ownership/control (i.e. smart cards [4] ).
In the rest of this section, we analyse three questions: (i) why a tamper-resistant device?, (ii) why a user centric ownership architecture?, and finally (iii) why we do not just opt for the TPM? A tamper-resistant device has a physical protection layer to avoid any intrusion attacks, as in most of the scenarios a tamper-resistant device is assumed to be in a malicious user's possession. This assumption is natural for banking, transport, and healthcare cards, [2] etc. In addition, these devices require an adequate protection and self-destruct mechanism from accidental or intentional damage. Therefore, a tamper-resistant device provides a secure, and reliable platform that can remain trustworthy even in the possession of a malicious user. Just focusing on the tamper-resistant is not the complete picture when we discuss the UCTD. We do not advocate tamperresistant as some sort of silver bullet that can solve all the security issues [39, 40] as other measures related to application and platform design are also required to compliment the hardware level protection [41] .
The rationale for emphasising for the user ownership of the UCTD is: (a) enabling an open, dynamic, and ubiquitous system, (b) individual developers (application providers) do not need to convince the scheme managers (e.g. as it is required in the ICOM or TSM based models for smart cards [4, 42] ) to gain permission to install their applications onto a UCTD, (c) UCTD users (owners) will get the choice to install or delete an application, and finally (d) user ownership will enable the scalability of the UCTD model (i.e. users can use their UCTD in conjunction with any of their devices).
Finally, why not just use TPM? It is already in the user's control, the TPM specification [21] requires tamper-resistant and it acts as a root-of-trust in the hand-held and traditional computing devices (i.e. MTM [35] and TPM [21] ). The rationale behind not choosing the TPM is: (i) the TPM is designed to support the trusted computing platform initiative [21] that is focused on the integrity of the platform rather then providing a dynamic and ubiquitous security and privacy model, (ii) the design of the TPM is specific to a particular platform as there are two different specifications for traditional computers and mobile phones: TPM [21] and MTM [35] respectively, (iii) TPM is not an execution platform on which an application code can execute, (iv) the basic functionality of a TPM is protected capabilities, integrity measurement and reporting; it does not make decisions but merely reports them to the requesting entity, and finally (v) TPM are required to be bonded to the platform.
The User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD) initiative proposes a unified, cross-platform, dynamic, and ubiquitous architecture for security and privacy services. Application developers can utilise the same architecture, whether they are targeting smart cards, hand-held or traditional computing devices; hence, enabling them to target Total Available Market (TAM) through a single device. Obviously, UCTD will be a computationally restricted device, so we cannot consider it a candidate for the processing of an entire application (e.g. video game). That is the reason why we restrict the UCTD to security and privacy services. The basic requirements for a UCTD are as below:
1) The device should have a tamper-resistant and tamperevident mechanism.
2) The device should provide a secure, and reliable software/hardware platform. 3) The device should enable the user's ownership either as a stand alone (i.e. UCOM), as part of administrative (i.e. corporate and parental control, etc.) or in the presence of a scheme manager (i.e. ICOM, or TSM, etc.). 4) The device not only stores the data and application code but also provides an execution environment. 5) The security and reliability mechanisms should be evaluated and certified by an independent third party. 6) It should have a dynamic and ubiquitous mechanism to provide verification and validation of security and reliability mechanisms (i.e. current state of the device is as secure and reliable as at the time of the evaluation) [37] . 7) The design should be generic so it can easily be integrated with any computing platform. 8) The design should not require the device to be bonded (soldiered) to the host platform. It should be portable and ubiquitous regarding connectivity with different platforms.
III. USER CENTRIC TAMPER-RESISTANT DEVICE
In this section, we open up the discussion by describing the UCTD framework. Subsequently, we analyse the rationale behind the architecture of the UCTD and then explain different components/concepts in the UCTD architecture.
A. Framework for User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
For the rest of the paper, the terms user, cardholder, and customer indicate the same entity that has the UCTD in her possession. A user acquires a UCTD from a UCTD supplier, and then manages it through a software referred as Card Application Management Software (CAMS): shown in figure  2 . The CAMS only provide an interface with the UCTD and there are no security requirements for it (i.e. as part of the design we consider that the CAMS implementation can be modified by a malicious user).
The user can then request a Service Provider (SP) that is an application provider that utilise the UCTD functionality to provide a secure, reliable and privacy-preserving service. The SP will then request the security and reliability verification and validation of the UCTD [37] . Only after the respective SP is satisfied with the security and functional-support of the UCTD that it will lease its applications. The application lease is governed by a security and functional-support policy of the respective SP referred as Application Lease Policy (ALP) [18] . The ALP is SP specific document and an SP can reject the request of the application lease if the requesting UCTD does not support the SP's ALP. Once the application is leased to the UCTD, it can be utilised by the user at any compatible computing platform shown as Service Access Point (SAP)/Host Platforms in figure 2 .
For the smart card environment, the downloaded application might be a standalone application that does not require any accompanying application on the host platform. In case of a smart card environment, the host platform is the card reader that communicates with the smart card. The readers need to have an application (of its own) that communicates with the smart card but this requirement is specifically not imposed by the smart card's applications, and it is installed separately by the entity that maintains the reader. For example, in the banking and telecom sector the reader only has to conform to a standardised application (e.g. EMV [43]); however, in transport-service scenario it varies as different operators install their own readers with customised applications (i.e. TFL [44] and Octopus [45] ). However, in case of hand-held and traditional computing devices applications installed on a UCTD might be part of a larger application that is actually installed on the host platform.
An application can be partitioned into segments depending upon security and privacy requirements, and the segment with the highest security and privacy requirement can be implemented as an isolated compartment of the whole application with well defined input and output. This isolated compartment can then be stored and executed on the UCTD. The slicing of an application according to its security and privacy requirements is discussed in [46, 47] ; therefore, for brevity we do not dive into its details.
B. Architectural Motivation
In this section, we will analyse the rationale behind the choice of a smart card as the underlying architecture for the UCTD.
The prevalent smart card platforms: Java Card [48] and Multos [49] have achieved high CC evaluation levels (i.e. a commercial Java Card has achieved EAL 5+ and Multos ITSEC 6 [50] ). In addition, they provide a well-defined and extensively studied (both in industry and academics) architecture for application development, application-management, and runtime environment. The GlobalPlatform specification [51] provides a balanced architecture for application management in which a third party can securely and independently manage its application(s) without relying on the respective centralised authority.
Reasoned expostulation to the expansion of the smart card as a cross-platform UCTD can be: (i) smart cards are almost always under the control of a centralised authority, which may be desirable (and even necessary) in the smart card environment but hand-held and traditional computing platforms do not entertain such centralised authorities to a large extend, (ii) the security and reliability assumptions in the smart card architecture are based on the centralised control, which are unsuitable for a user centric security architecture of the UCTD [37, 52] , (iii) the storage and processing capacity of the smart card may not be adequate, (iv) the communication interface between a smart card and a reader is low on bandwidth (i.e. speed), and finally (v) smart cards are single task platforms (i.e. Java Card 3 [48] supports multi-threading but not multitasking).
In response to expostulations listed above, the UCOM [4] is a user centric ownership model and UCTD will be an extension of the same model accommodating the cross-platform requirements. The UCTD will analyse the necessary changes to the existing architecture of the smart card platform to accommodate the user centric architecture (see section III-C). The storage and processing restrictions are historical artefacts of the smart card technology, and by no means the limitation of the technology. Therefore, having a large storage capacity and Universal Serial Bus (USB) [53] interface is possible, but it will incur an extra cost than existing smart cards (i.e. most industries acquire smart cards to issue to their customers for free, so keeping cost low is desirable). It is correct that smart cards are single task platform, and we do not consider any argument for having UCTD as a multi-task platform. The issue at stake here is the possibility that it will degrade the performance of the application(s) that relies on the UCTD. Firstly, the part of the application installed on the UCTD should be as small as possible and secondly the design of the overall application should take into account the capabilities of the UCTD. Another concern will be that an application can monopolise the UCTD thus actively preventing the access by other applications on the platform. This can easily be resolved by limiting the possibility that any application on the UCTD can go into infinite loops (i.e. bytecode verification [54] ), maintain a timing counter on the UCTD which switches to a default application if the current application does not perform any operation, or it is not communicating on any interface channel, and interrupts that releases the control of the UCTD. To hand-held and traditional computing platforms, a UCTD should be treated as a resource (i.e. printer, camera, and keyboard, etc.) that is managed by the platform's operating 
C. User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device
Hereafter, the terms smart card and UCTD mean the same, and they are used interchangeably, unless specified. The UCTD architecture is illustrated in figure 3 . At bottom is the smart card hardware layer on which there is a Trusted Execution & Execution Manager (TEM) that provide platform security and reliability service. Above TEM is the Smart Card Runtime Environment (SCRT) that provides an execution platform to applications that are in the top layer. In between the SCRT and application layer is the smart card firewall [55] that restrict any unauthorised communication between applications. In the rest of section, for brevity we will only discuss those components that: (a) provide smart card ownership management services, (b) enable administrative oversight (if required), (c) provide a secure and reliable application management, and finally (d) enable security and reliability assurance and validation.
1) Trusted Environment & Execution Manager:
The architecture of the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM) is illustrated in figure 4 . We will only discuss those components of the TEM that relate to the above listed features.
The "Ownership Manager" (TEM-OM) facilitates different ownership scenarios discussed in section IV along with their acquisition and management. In case, a smart card is under a centralised control because either its part of a corporate network, a TSM, or in parental control, etc. The smart card would be enrolled with a scheme manager (centralised authority), which is handled by the "Scheme Registration Manager" (TEM-SRM). Furthermore, the TEM-SRM is responsible for managing/enforcing the control and privileges that a scheme manager has on the platform. The application lease by an SP is In addition, TEM-LCM also handles the delegation of the control of application domain to the respective SP. The "SC-TEM Runtime Security Manager" ensures the safe and reliable execution of an application and the complete mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. The "Attestation Handler" and the "Self-test Manager" provides security assurance and validation that the platform's state is as it was at the time of the third party evaluation (i.e. CC Evaluation [38] ). During the application installation process, they affirm to the SP that the platform is as secure and reliable as it is stated by the evaluation certificate 5 [37] . The self-test mechanism validates both the hardware and software state (i.e. Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) [2] ) to be as it was at the time of the evaluation. One possible avenue is to utilise the Physically Unclonable Functions [57] (PUFs) to provide hardware validation and hash generation for verification of software state, which is part of ongoing research.
2) Device Platform: The UCTD proposal is neutral regarding the Smart Card Runtime Environment (SCRT) (i.e. Java Card and Multos). The UCTD does not prefer any particular SCRT as long as it meets the UCTD's requirements (section II-D)
3) Spaces: A space in the UCTD context is a logical boundary that contains a set of applications that belong on a particular entity. For example, as shown in figure 3 , there are two distinctive spaces: Platform and Application Space. Each user is given access right to individual spaces with application installation and deletion privileges. The Platform Space belongs to the smart card platform itself (i.e. no offcard entity has the control of this space), and it contains functionality that provides different services on the smart card, including the administrative management and user ownership. Whereas, the Application Space belongs to users that can have administrative privileges on the UCTD or a non-administrator user. This architecture allows the UCTD to be shared by a number of users.
4) Domains:
A domain is the logical boundary that contains an application. The application's SP has cryptographic binding (cryptographic keys to authenticate and execute privilege commands: update, modify, block, and unblock the application, etc.) with the domain. No other party, including the smart card owner is given the privilege to access and read the contents of a domain. In short, the concept of the domains in the UCTD is similar to the GlobalPlatform specification [51] . Except that in most of the smart card deployments, the domains are static entities, and they are not generated dynamically because it would require memory management service. A fixed size pre-defined domain may be workable for the UCTD but there is a possibility that it might lead to internal fragmentation 6 or discriminate certain applications that require more space than the fixed domains. Therefore, a UCTD will opt for having dynamic domains generations depending upon the respective application's requirements.
5) Protection Zones:
The Protection Zones are concerned with the security and reliability level associated with each application. As a design decision, applications are not required to be certified by a trusted third party evaluation (i.e. CC). The reason behind this decision was motivated by the high cost that is incurred for the security evaluation [56] , which might ward off small and medium scale companies to utilise the UCTD. To enable an effective protection mechanism on the UCTD, the concept of Protection Zones in which applications are categories according to their security and reliability classifications. Applications that have an evaluation certificate would be most trusted, and applications without any evaluation would be considered potentially dangerous. This classification is utilised to manage a secure and reliable inter-application communication (i.e. application sharing) [55] and execution environment (i.e. SCRT).
IV. CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
In this section, we will discuss the nature of the term "Ownership", along with how a user can acquire and delegate.
A. Device Ownership
Device ownership is a privilege in the UCSM that gives a user the choice to install or delete any application she is entitled to. The entitlement is restricted in two ways: (1) a lease of an application is at the sole discretion of the respective SP and if the user's smart card does not satisfy the SP's ALP it can reject the application installation request, and (2) the user is not allowed to install an application because of administrative restrictions (i.e. corporate policy or age restrictions as enforced by parental control). The user ownership is about choice not control of the respective SP's application; therefore, it is different from the open card initiative discussed in [5] . In this initiative, a user acquires an application from the respective SP and then installs the software on the smart card. The problem with this initiative among others is that the SP does not have control over the host platform and a mechanism to enforce its ALP.
There are two types of ownerships that an off-card entity can have on a UCTD and these are discussed in subsequent sections.
1) Administrative Ownership:
This ownership privilege is enabled in the UCTD to accommodate the requirements of IT infrastructure in a corporate, government or public institution (i.e. schools, library, etc.) to manage the hand-held and traditional computing platforms. In addition, the administrative ownership enables the scheme in which an organisation (i.e. MNOs, CIBs, TSOs, SCMs and MPMs, etc.) can issue a smart card to its customers and charge either the application provider or user on each application download (i.e. Coopetitive Architecture [58] ).
An entity with admin privileges can install an application in any space on a UCTD. This can enable the entity to install certain protection applications (i.e. related to network/system user policy, firewall and antivirus definitions, and content filters, etc.) in all spaces on the UCTD. However, this ownership does not give the privilege to delete any application that is installed by a user. In addition, an entity with administrative ownership can evict a user from the UCTD, and this process will delete all applications installed in the user's space.
2) User Ownership: This is the typical ownership that a user will have on a UCTD. There are two scenarios in the user ownership: (1) the UCTD is subscribed with an administrative authority (discussed in previous section), and (2) there is no administrative authority on the UCTD, as in UCOM initiative [4] .
In the first case, the user has some restrictions imposed on to herself from the respective administrative authority. However, in the second case there is no administrative authority and the user has complete freedom on the UCTD. Therefore, in second case we can that she is the administrator and user at the same time. Figure 5 shows a generic overview of the ownership acquisition process that is explained below:
B. Ownership Acquisition & Delegation
The UCTD at the pre-issuance state is under the default ownership, which is in reality under the ownership of the UCTD manufacturer. The ownership details are communicated to the user as she will use it during the ownership acquisition phase. The user can request the UCTD to provide with the security and reliability verification and validation (system self-test). On this request, the "Attestation Handler" (section III-C1) is selected that requests the user for the ownership credentials. An off-card entity can only request the system self-test after explicit authorisation from the current owner of the UCTD. At this stage, the current owner is the UCTD manufacturer, so the user will enter the default ownership details. The UCTD will perform the system self-test and signs the result with the TEM signature key pair. The CAMS will verify the signature and displays the details of the self-test, including the capability list (i.e. implemented security and operational functionality). Figure 5 . Ownership Acquisition Process Now, the user can initiate the ownership acquisition process, and in response to the ownership acquisition request the UCTD will initiate "Ownership Manager" (section III-C1) that requests the user to provide the default ownership credentials along with the new user's details. The user will provide these details through CAMS to the UCTD. Part of this process will also require the authentication credentials for the user, which may be a Personal Identification Number (PIN), password, or biometric data. The choice of the authentication credentials is left to the UCTD manufacturers and user's choice. On receipt of these details, the UCTD will generate a signature key pair associated with the user and certified by the TEM signature key pair. The user key pair is used during the application download process to verify to the SP that the user is indeed the owner of the UCTD.
The ownership delegation process is used when a user leaves the control of a UCTD to re-sell or scraping the device. The process is pretty much similar to the ownership acquisition but this time the user requests ownership delegation that will delete the user's space and any applications installed in it.
In case there is an administrator on the UCTD, then its her privilege to create user's account (the administrator does not provide any credentials. She just gives the number of users that will be using the device). The created user account will be under default ownership, and then each user can initiate the ownership acquisition process to gain their control.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, discuss two case studies that relate to the implementation (adoption) of the UCTD architecture. The first case study is related to the smart card environment, where the second case study focuses on the hand-held and traditional computing environments.
A. Dynamism in the UCTD
The user ownership enables a user to establish relationships with SPs ubiquitously, which is referred as dynamism. Consider a scenario in the proposed TSM model in which a user who travels extensively around the world (for business or pleasure) acquires a smart card from a TSM in one country. Now when he travels to another country and wants to access certain services that are specific to the visiting country, she cannot download them onto her smart card. The reasons behind this might be that the services in the second country are not associated (part of) the TSM from which he acquired the smart card. To further explain the scenario consider the local transport service, as in different countries they have different transport operators that have different services associated with their smart card (or applications in case of TSM). Explaining the example further, consider Oyster Card [44] which a user can use in London to access to local transport services and at the time of writing, it cannot be used as an e-purse. Where the Octopus Card [45] which a user uses in Hong Kong to gain access to local services can also be used at local shops (i.e. groceries, confectioneries, and restaurants, etc.). For our user, she would still have to queue to get the smart card when he reaches the second country. As we pointed out that he extensively travels around the world then he may not find a great benefit that the current proposed TSM architecture.
Nevertheless, in the UCTD the user does not have to acquire a new smart card to gain access to new services. The open and dynamic nature of the UCTD allows a user to install or delete any application she is entitled, enabling her to download any application when she reaches the visiting country and continues using the same device. This dynamism is a corner stone of the UCTD design philosophy; enabling users to suit the product to their requirements not the other way around.
B. Online Gaming Made Secure
At the time of writing the paper, the security breach of the Sony's PlayStation Network and Qriocity services that to some estimates has revealed private information regarding 70 million users [59] was in the news. This breach has shown that big networks that store user's privacy sensitive data are the prime targets for malicious users. In this section, we are not going to provide a solution to the problems faced by the Sony in this security breach but look at how UCTD can reduce the clustering of large data at one point (i.e. SP's servers) that in return give a potential motivation for attack (i.e. economics) [60] .
Therefore, for this case study, we consider a company A that offers an online-gaming platform, and games store to its customers. The objectives of the company A are: (1) customers can be uniquely identified and their credentials can be validated, (2) customers get the services for which they are authorised, and finally (3) customer can make purchases while being logged onto the games store or online-gaming platform.
Company A offers an application that a user can download on to her UCTD. The download application is personalised to the user. It has user's name, email address and postal address (if necessary). The user identity at Company A's server is identified by a unique user identity (i.e. it is a pseudo-identity that does not have any obvious link to the user). The user has her password stored her UCTD rather than on the Company A's server; therefore, when the user tries to access Company A's resources she gives a password to the UCTD. As its beyond the scope of this paper we do not dive into the details of how the user identification and authentication will be carried out using UCTD in our case study, but similar mechanisms are already implemented like the EMV DDA or CDA mechanisms [43] (i.e. card transactions at a POS). This will allow Company A to identity and authenticate their customer. In addition, the service privileges associated with the user are also stored in the application. Therefore, Company A does not have to store any of these details as they are already stored on a tamperresistant device and managed by their own application.
Furthermore, to perform online monetary transactions the user does not have to register her credit card to the Company A that then have to invest a huge amount to safeguard its security. In our case study, the user also has a banking application (issued by her bank) installed on the UCTD. When a user makes a purchase online, the UCTD application of the Company A will communicate that purchase request to the banking application that will then process the transaction (e.g. 3D-Secure [29] but asking the user to enter her password not at the bank's website but to the UCTD application). Thus removing any requirement to register the card on the Company A's website.
In this case study, we have decentralised the data storage that is related to the user's identification and online payment (i.e. credit card details). In comparison, it is comparatively easy to implement a (small) embedded secure application and get is certified by an independent third party than implementing and securing a large database of user's credit card details. We do not suggest that in our proposed case study attacks are completely eliminated. As active and physical adversaries can perform attacks, but economics of such attacks are limited and in comparison less attractive than the compromise of a centralised database (i.e. 70 million user's data: Sony's Servers). With adequate foresight, attacks from an active and physical adversary can be limited.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we put forward a proposal for a cross-platform, secure and fault-tolerant tamper-resistant device that is based on the smart card architecture. It can be used as a security and privacy preserving device that can be integrated ubiquitously with any supported platform. We kept the design as generic so it can easily be incorporated with the existing architecture of different computing platforms. In addition, we discussed in this paper that the UCTD is by no means a substitute for the TPM, as they have separate functions. The reason for opting for a generic execution platform was to target Total Available Market (TAM) of computing platforms and keeping the design flexible so it can integrate seamlessly with existing architectures (i.e. as USB tokens or as Memory Cards).
As part of the future work, we will focus on the UCTD selftest mechanism along with ensuring the security and reliability of the execution environment (e.g. SCRT). Furthermore, explore different application scenarios of the UCTD in hand-held and traditional computing devices.
